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Partnership Taxation-INTANGIBLE DRILLING COSTS MEET SUB-

STANTIAL ECONOMIC EFFECT-Allison

Tax Cas. (CCH)

v. United States, 83-1 U.S.

9241 (Ct. App. Fed. Cir. 1983)

Partners, not partnerships, are subject to federal income taxation, and each partner declares his share of partnership income or
loss individually.' The partners may set their shares together, or
they may be calculated in accord with the partners' interest in the
partnership.2 The flexible passing of tax consequences has made
the partnership a commonly used device to generate and market
tax shelters. By virtue of the deferral period which results, the taxpayer in effect receives a forced "loan" from the government for
the amount of the tax liability. In addition, a conversion to capital
gains may also result in a reduction of the liability.' Flexible allocations are limited primarily by the requirement that distributions
not in accord with partnership interests must have substantial economic effect.4
Certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code, such as the intangible drilling costs (IDC) deduction, 5 are set up by Congress in
order to provide loans in the form of reduced tax liabilities to individuals who make certain preferred expenditures. These deductions are also generally available to partnerships. However, the
partnership allocation standards employed to discourage the waste
of tax shelters may simultaneously prevent deductions from reaching taxpayers whom Congress intended to encourage.
Allison v. United States7 is just such a case. In Allison, the
court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court upholding
the deduction of intangible drilling costs passed through the partnership to those who put up the funds. This note will review the
two decisions, particularly focusing on how and why the court of
appeals ruled as it did.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

Facts of Allison

The case developed from the involvement of taxpayer-plaintiff
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

I.R.C. §§ 701, 702 (CCH 1983).
I.R.C. § 704 (CCH 1983).
See I.R.C. § 1202 (CCH 1983).
I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (CCH 1983).
I.R.C. § 263(c) (CCH 1983).
I.R.C. § 703 (CCH 1983).
83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9241 (Ct. App. Fed. Cir. 1983).
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James E. Allison through a pyramid of partnerships in an oil and
gas drilling venture off the coast of Indonesia.8 Initially, in September, 1968, the Independent Indonesian American Petroleum
Company (IIAPCO) contracted with Pertamina, the state-run oil
and gas company of Indonesia, for IIAPCO to drill for oil in an
unexplored area off the coast of Sumatra.'
In early 1969, Herbert Dillon, Jr., became aware that IIAPCO
desired to find individuals to supply eight to ten million dollars for
an exploratory drilling program.' 0 Negotiations resulted in a letter
agreement to form a partnership to conduct the exploration and
production of oil in the contract area. 1 Reading and Bates Company was to drill 40,000 feet of hole in the contract area for a 17%
interest. The tax deductions for intangible drilling costs (IDC)
were to go to the individuals who supplied the cash for the drilling,
and Dillon was to provide such individuals.'
Dillon formed Indonesian Marine Resources (Indomar), a Texas
limited partnership, in order to raise the required funds. 3 Among
those investing in this partnership was the R. Ashland Shepherd
partnership (Shepherd) which had been formed by Dillon's attorney (of the same name) in order to invest.14 Allison, also an attor8. Allison and his wife filed suit to recover amounts they were required to pay in additional federal income taxes and deficiency interest for their 1970 tax return. Id. at 86,566.
9. Id. at 86,565. The drilling area was approximately 32 million acres. IIAPCO paid one
million dollars to Pertamina and agreed to spend $22.5 million more for exploration and, if
oil was found, to produce oil in the area. Forty percent of the proceeds from any oil found
would go to IIAPCO to pay its costs. The remaining proceeds would be split, 65% to
Pertamina, 35% to IIAPCO. Id. at 86,565 n.3. IIAPCO then transferred an undivided
22.685% interest to Carver-Dodge International Co. (Carver-Dodge) and an undivided
9.074% interest to Warrior International Corp. (Warrior). Both corporations were associated
with IIAPCO in its general venture in the northwest Java Sea. Allison v. United States, 82-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9163, at 83,215 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
10. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,215. Dillon discovered the IIAPCO opportunity
through the Reading and Bates Offshore Drilling Company (Reading and Bates), an oil
drilling company which had worked with IIAPCO in the past, and he authorized Reading
and Bates to act as his undisclosed agent in negotiations between IIAPCO, Carver-Dodge
and Warrior. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,565.
11. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,565. Dillon's role in the negotiations which led to
IIAPCO, Carver-Dodge and Warrior contributing their interests was not disclosed to them
until three days after they signed the letter agreement in August of 1969 to form a partnership. Each of the companies contributed its interest in the contract to the partnership. Id.
12. Id. The deductibility of IDC is provided for under I.R.C. § 263(c) (CCH 1983).
13. Dillon would contribute to Indomar any property rights to the Indonesian contract
he obtained in exchange for his interest as a general partner in Indomar. Persons who then
contributed cash would be allowed to invest as limited partners. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
at 83,216.
14. Id. at 83,217. Mr. Shepherd also recommended the use of the limited partnership
vehicle to raise the required funds. Id.
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ney, invested $10,459 in the Shepherd partnership, thus becoming
15
involved in the Indonesian oil drilling.
In the meantime, Indomar finalized the Southeast Exploration
(Souex) partnership agreement with IIAPCO, Carver-Dodge and
Warrior. Indomar agreed to contribute $8.75 million, which was
earmarked for the costs of the exploratory drilling, and thus receive the IDC resulting from its contribution. Reading and Bates
decided to stay outside of Souex, receive the $8.75 million for the
drilling work and retain a 4% interest in the Indonesian contract.
Souex owned the remaining 96% interest. L
The agreement further provided that if oil or gas of commercial
value was discovered by any of the exploratory drilling, or if additional wells were drilled, each partner could decide to invest additional cash in proportion to its partnership interest. If any partner
did not contribute, it would lose its interest in the particular well
and the surrounding block. 17 Finally, upon liquidation, each partner would acquire an undivided interest equal to its partnership
interest in any partnership asset to which it had not lost its rights
by refusing to further invest."8
During 1970, Reading and Bates drilled eight wells under the
contract.1 9 No oil or gas was found in the wells. IIAPCO proposed
15. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,564. Allison's investment occurred in 1970, the tax
year at issue. Id.
16. Id. at 86,565. The decision of Reading and Bates to remain outside the partnership is
not explained. The interest of the partners in Souex were set as follows:
IIAPCO
Carver-Dodge

59.0000 percent
19.6131 percent

Warrior

7.8452 percent

Indomar

13.5417 percent

Id. Indomar's interest in the partnership secured it a 13% interest in the underlying contract. Souex held 96% of that contract and Indomar therefore acquired 13%. To calculate

the percentage, Indomar would require Souex to secure 13 of Souex's 96 points. The formula
is as follows:
13
1
96

=

X
-

X =

1300 "/. 96

or 13.54166

100 (Souex)

The importance of the partnership interests set out is that each partner would share in
any taxable income or loss in the same percentage as their interest, except for the IDC and
any income or loss attributable to wells in which a partner had not chosen to participate. Id.
at 86,565-66.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 86,566.
19. Id. Only $8.57 million of the $8.75 million was paid in 1970 and is the subject of this
litigation. Id. After 1971, Souex liquidated by agreement and the partners continued as joint
owners. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,219.
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the drilling of five additional wells. While Indomar was considering
continued involvement in Souex, one of the wells hit oil in commercial quantities. Naturally, Indomar chose to remain involved
and increased its investment.2
Also in 1970, Souex allocated all of its IDC to Indomar. Indomar
passed this allocation on to its partners, including Shepherd, which
further allocated $10,180.27 to Allison. 21 Thus, Allison claimed a
deduction on his 1970 tax return of slightly less than his cash investment for that year.
IIAPCO's management philosophy encouraged it to minimize
financial exposure by seeking outside capital. When Dillon committed himself to find investors, he helped IIAPCO limit the risk it
faced in the Indonesian deal. While IIAPCO believed favorable geologic structures and basins might exist in the contract area based
on seismic work, the area was totally unexplored. This drilling in
the contract area involved all the risks inherent in a "wildcat"
22
area.

The trial court observed that such investment was common in
the 1960's, where risk capital investors received deductions in exchange for accepting the risk.
Mr. Dillon made it clear . . . that in order to be able to raise

money from investors, he must be able to offer what was normally
offered to investors, i.e., a special allocation of tax deductions for
IDC....

[T]he risk of total loss of their investment would have

to be assumed by investors who provided the money for the drilling of exploratory wells.... 23
Thus, the persons who invested in Indomar were told they would
receive the deductions which resulted from the drilling they
20. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,566. The eight original wells were all abandoned. In
fact, Indomar had decided not to continue with Souex, but Dillon had not yet told Souex
when the ninth well hit. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,218-19.
21. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,218-19. Souex allocated Indomar approximately $9
million in losses, including the $8.57 million in IDC resulting from the initial investment.
Indomar allocated approximately $253,000 of the $9 million to Shepherd. The IRS disallowed the IDC-based deduction, claiming the Souex allocation to Indomar improperly exceeded Indomar's 13.5417% interest in Souex and was therefore invalid. Id. at 83,219. According to the IRS, the amount of additional tax owed by Allison for 1970 was $7,843 plus
interest. Id. at 83,215.
22. Id. at 83,215. The trial court also found that any wells drilled in the area would be
wildcat wells, and the prospects of success would be no greater than one in fifteen, or one in
twenty. Id. at 83,218. No offshore oil or gas production was occurring in the vicinity of the
area, and the closest onshore production had occurred 150 miles distant. Id. at 83,215.
23. Id. at 83,216 (emphasis added).
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financed in proportion to their investment. The trial court concluded "that in the absence of such assurances, none of the persons
who invested in Indomar would have been willing to provide
money for a wildcat drilling program in the Southeast Sumatra
Contract area."2" All the Souex partners understood that such an
allocation would be required, and no reason other than acquiring
risk capital was discussed by them in deciding to set aside the IDC
deductions for Indomar.26
Forming the Souex partnership completed the distribution of interests in the Indonesian contract. Neither the "contract" partners'
nor the "cash" partners' interests alone would have sufficed. For
the long, complicated process of acquiring the "cash" partners to
succeed, it was necessary to distribute the IDC to them. IDC was
not necessary to encourage the investments of the "contract" partners, who never expected it or bargained to retain it.
B. Section 263(c): Intangible Drilling Costs
The intangible drilling costs deduction which Allison shared, and
for which Dillon bargained, is allowed under Internal Revenue
Code section 263(c). 2 ' Basically, the section allows an operator,2 7 at
his option, to elect to charge intangible drilling and development
costs incurred in the development of oil and gas properties to ei24. Id. at 83,217. While reversing the trial court, the court of appeals stated: "We do not
doubt . . . that a special allocation of IDC was in this instance the sine qua non for the
Indomar partners' investment in Souex." Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,568.
25. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,218.
26. I.R.C. § 263 (CCH 1983) reads as follows:

§ 263.

CAPITAL EXPENDITURES

(a)

General rule-No deduction shall be allowed for(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or
estate....
(2) Any amount expended in restoring property or in making good the
exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or has been made.

(c) Intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells
and geothermal wells.Notwithstanding subsection (a), regulations shall be prescribed by the
Secretary under this subtitle corresponding to the regulations which
granted the option to deduct as expenses intangible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas wells and which were recognized and
approved by the Congress in House Concurrent Resolution 50, Seventyninth Congress. ...
27. "Operator" is defined as "one who holds a working or operating interest in any tract
or parcel of land either as a fee owner or under a lease or any other form of contract granting working or operating rights." Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).

1983]

PARTNERSHIP TAXATION

ther capital or expense.2 If charged to capital, the expenditures
are either recovered by depletion or depreciation, or are claimed as
an ordinary loss if incurred in drilling a nonproductive well.2 9 Otherwise, the expenditures are deductible as a current expense. If it
were not for the special operation of section 263(c), the expenditures would be charges to capital under section 263(a).3 0
Intangible drilling and development costs consist of "all wages,
fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.. . . necessary for the drilling of
wells and the preparation of wells for the production of oil or
gas."" As such, IDC represents an opportunity for a quicker recovery of invested capital through a tax deduction than would be otherwise available under normal circumstances.
The section was originally added to the Code in 1954 by the Senate without any comment as to its purpose.12 The purpose was discussed, however, while considering, in 1976, a series of limitations
on such deductions. 3 A House report stated: "Allowing a current
deduction for intangible drilling costs is usually justified on the
grounds that it provides an incentive for the discovery of new
reserves of oil and gas. For this purpose the deduction for intangibles can be an efficient incentive . . . since it directly encourages new drilling.31 4 The related Senate report noted that adverse
28. Id. Tress. Reg. § 1.263(c)-1 (1960) directs the reader to Tress. Reg. § 1.612-4 and
contains no other text.
29. Tress. Reg. § 1.612-4(b) (1965).
30. See supra note 26. See also F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 149 F.2d 238, reh'g denied en banc, 150 F.2d 857 (1945).
31. Tress. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965). The option does not apply to items which have salvage value themselves under the regulations. Id.; see also Harper Oil Co. v. United States,
425 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 1970) (court held that in some cases an item may have no
salvage value and still fail to qualify for the deduction, particularly tangible goods).
32. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4621, 4862; H.R. CON. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5280, 5292. The deduction had resulted from Treasury Department regulations in 1917, and after these were challenged in F.H.E. Oil Co., 147 F.2d at
1002-03, Congress adopted H.R. Con. Res. 50, 59 Stat. 844 (1945), which declared the deduction option to have been intended by it under then current I.R.C. provisions. Exxon Corp. v.
United States, 547 F.2d 548, 553-54 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
33. The limitations were attempts to restrict deductions to the amount "at risk." For a
description of the rules, see A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWArME, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION §§ 53-58, 60-66 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter A. WILLIS].
34. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2897, 2948-49 (emphasis added) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 658]. The report continued by noting that such deductions, however, had been marketed by some as a means of
reducing taxes on unrelated income. This marketing "solely" for tax advantages was said to
distort the marketplace and tempt taxpayers to make unprofitable investments. Id. Allison
could not be characterized as this sort of deal.
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economic impact that might result from a limitation on section
263(c) "since we are falling far short of reaching . . . our goal of
energy independence." ' 8 Congress therefore has assigned section
263(c) an important place in the government's efforts to encourage
production of energy resources. 36
The deductibility of Souex's expenses as IDC was not the issue
which faced the court in Allison.3 7 Yet, the declared purpose and
intent of Congress to encourage investment in oil and gas exploration has been affected by the Allison court's conclusion under the
partnership tax rules. Despite the understanding of those in Souex
that the IDC would be required by investors putting up the cash,
in other words, that the IDC would be used exactly as Congress
planned, their allocation of the deductions failed to meet the test
applied by the court of appeals.

II. SECTION 704(B)(2): PRINCIPAL PURPOSE V. SUBSTANTIAL
ECONoMIc EFFECT
A.

The Courts' Opinions in Allison

Internal Revenue Code section 704 is the relevant provision addressed in Allison.38 Subsection (b)(2) at the time provided that if
35. S.REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3439, 3475 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 9381.
36. See Exxon, 547 F.2d at 553-55. The court took an opportunity to review the history
and purpose of IDC. In reaching its conclusion that an IDC deduction was appropriate, it
noted that "[bly the expedient of a stingy reading, one should not frustrate the obvious
Congressional purpose to encourage oil and gas prospecting." Id. at 558. The court also
reflected that:
Congress has consistently viewed the optional treatment of IDC as an incentive to
oil and gas prospecting and exploration, clearly a continuing objective of national
importance. It follows that Congress favors a liberal interpretation of the regulation .... These background observations show that the courts should not be niggardly in their approach to [IDC].
Id. at 555 (footnote omitted).
37. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,564 n.l.
38. I.R.C. § 704 (1954). Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,564; see also Allison, 82-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. at 83,219. Section 704 reads as follows:
§ 704. PARTNER'S DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE.
(a) Effect of partnership agreement-A partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit shall, except as otherwise provided in
this section, be-determined by the partnership agreement.
(b) Distributive share determined by income or loss ratio-A partner's
distributive share of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit
shall be determined in accordance with his distributive share of taxable income or loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)(9), for the
taxable year, if-
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"the principle purpose of any provision in the partnership agreement with respect to the partner's distributive share of such item
is the avoidance or evasion of any tax," then the partner's distributive share would be determined by his "share of taxable income
or loss of the partnership. ' s9 Such an allocation by a partnership
not in accord with the partner's general interest in the partnership
is known as a special allocation. 0 The question faced in Allison
concerned the principal purpose of the allocation of 100% of the
IDC deduction to Indomar by Souex, while Indomar's general interest in the Souex partnership was only 13.5417%.
The trial court began with the proposition that "the special allocation provision in the Souex partnership agreement was effective
. . . unless 'the principal purpose' of the provision was tax avoidance." '4 1 For the purpose of tax avoidance to be "principal," it must
be the "most important."' 2 Such a standard had been adopted regarding similar Code sections by previous courts.' 3
Clearly, tax avoidance was a purpose of the IDC allocation in
Allison. "However, tax avoidance is not reprehensive, or even unpatriotic." 4 4 In fact, in the case of IDC deductions, tax avoidance is
a vehicle of national policy in energy production. The court then
considered all the circumstances relating to the allocation provision in the partnership agreement to determine the principal pur45
pose behind it.
(1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to the partner's distributive share of such item, or
(2) the principal purpose of any provision in the partnership
agreement with respect to the partner's distributive share of such
item is the avoidance or evasion of any tax imposed by this subtitle.
I.R.C. § 704 (1954).
39. I.R.C. § 704(b) (1954) (emphasis added). In a case where the allocation set by the
agreement of taxable income and that set for taxable loss were different, this reallocation
clause could have unclear results. However, in Allison, the allocation share of Indomar for
everything other than IDC was set at 13.5417%. See supra note 16.
40. See Hamilton v. United States, 687 F.2d 408, 413 (Ct. Cl. 1982). See also S. REP. No.
938, supra note 35, 1954 U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS at 3534.
41. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,219. The court noted that there was no suggestion
in the evidence of any purpose of tax evasion. Id.
42. Id. at 83,220 (citing WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, (1977)).
43. Id. Hawaiian Trust Co. v. United States, 291 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1961), declared
the purpose "must exceed in importance any other purpose." Id. VGS Corp. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 563 (1977), restated the principle to require that the purpose "must outrank,
or exceed in importance, any other single purpose." 68 T.C. at 595 (citations omitted).
44. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,220 (citing Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810
(2d Cir. 1934)).
45. Id. The court relied on Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395, 401 (1970), aff'd per
curiam, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-1069 (9th Cir. 1973).
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The court made a finding of fact that the entire $8.75 million
Indomar invested in Souex was at risk. It implied that Indomar
would either end up with nothing to show for its money or, if the
drilling should be successful, enormous rewards "commensurate
with the risk."4 6 Should the drilling be unsuccessful, as it was, Indomar's "only hope" of recovering its investment, would be further
investment in future drilling.4 Clearly, Indomar could find itself
throwing good money after bad in such a risky venture.
For these reasons, the trial court held that it was not the principal purpose of the special allocation to avoid taxation. "[T]he principal motivation behind the inclusion of the provision was the business objective of inducing people of means to' provide the money
needed. . . . None of the companies having legal interests . . . at
the time. . . had sufficient funds to finance an exploratory drilling
program. 4 8 The money could not be raised unless the IDC was
offered to reduce the risk of the investment,49 since such an offer
was customary in the oil and gas business. Because the principal
purpose of the allocation was its business purpose, the allocation
was valid. 0
Secondly, the trial court held that an allocation can be properly
given to a partner who bears the economic burden of the expenditure of the deduction allocated.51 In this case that burden rested
on Indomar since it put up the entire cost creating the IDC deduction. According to the court, the fact that Indomar received its
46. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,218.
47. Id. The court of appeals did not accept the argument that Indomar retained no interest of any value in Souex unless it made further contributions. The court noted that
Indomar would retain its 13.5417% interest in the contract itself on liquidation, or 13% of
the contract. This retained right was not valueless even after the $8.75 million was exhausted. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,570-71. For calculation of Indomar's interest in
the contract itself, see supra note 16.
48. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,220 (emphasis added).
49. Id. The risk of the investment would be reduced by the IDC allocation, since the
partners receiving it could apply the deduction to reduce their taxes owed on other income
in the same year. Thus, for taxpayers in the highest bracket for 1970, the real dollar value of
the deduction is only equal to the highest bracket amount. I.R.C. § 1 (CCH 1969). Since this
reduction in taxes was guaranteed to the Indomar investors, the real value of the cash they
stood to lose if the investment was a total failure was not their investment amount, but
their investment amount reduced by 70% of their IDC deduction. In Allison's case, this
would be nearly 70% of his entire investment. See supra notes 15 & 21 and accompanying
text.
50. Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,220.
51. Id. The trial court relied on Lewis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 625, 632-33 (1975) and
Boynton v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1140
(1982) for its economic burden test. Id.
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partnership interest in Souex in exchange for the funds shifted
none of the burden to the other Souex partners since Indomar received no right to any future income without some further investment. If the $8.75 million were lost, the loss would be borne by
Indomar alone. Thus, the court held the provision valid because it
allocated the deduction to the partner who bore the burden under52
lying it.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court,5" finding that the
trial judge emphasized the wrong standard to validate the special
allocation and that the allocation was proscribed under the correct
standard. The court ruled that the 'principal purpose' of 'tax
avoidance'" provision primarily raised a question of whether the
special allocation of the partnership agreement had "substantial
economic effect."54 While the trial judge had discussed the economic effect of the allocation in discussing the economic burden
underlying the allocation, the court of appeals believed the trial
'55
judge "did not afford that factor its significant role.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed the language of the test
listed in section 704(b)(2) from the "principal purpose" standard,
used by the trial court and applicable to Allison, to require that
special allocations have substantial economic effect. The court of
appeals relied on the substantial economic effect test since it concluded, from the case law and articles on the subject, that the substantial economic effect test had been adopted by the courts to
evaluate "principal purpose" even before 1976.&1 The court prevented the allocation without questioning either the riskiness of
the deal or its necessity for bringing in the cash partner,
57
Indomar.
52.

Allison, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,220-21.

53.

Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,564.

54.

Id. at 86,567.

55. Id. at 86,568.
56. Id. at 86,567. The court of appeals relied on Hamilton v. United States, 687 F.2d 408
(Ct. Cl. 1982); Magaziner v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. 873 (CCH) (1978); Harris v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 770 (1974); Weidner, PartnershipAllocations and Capital Accounts Analysis, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 466 (1981) [hereinafter Weidner]; Kopple, Allocations of Profits and
Losses and Selected Basic Problems of Partnerships,27 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 635 (1975) [hereinafter Kopple]; W. McKEE, W. NELSON, & P. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS V 10-6, 10-11 (1977) [hereinafter W. McKEE]; Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. at 86,567.
57.

Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,568.
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The Ascendency of Substantial Economic Effect

Initially, substantial economic effect stood in opposition to a
purpose of tax avoidance and, as used in the Senate report accompanying the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, it explained the "principal purpose of tax avoidance" test. 8 From that time, it has developed to dominate section 704(b) decisions, so that the court of
appeal's declaration that the 1976 "change in language had minor
substantive effect, at best," 9 may not be far from the truth.
While the 1954 House report did not mention substantial economic effect or any other standard for section 704(b)(2), 60 the Senate report did include one sentence: "Where, however, a provision
in a partnership agreement for a special allocation of certain items
has substantial economic effect and is not merely a device for reducing the taxes of certain partners without actually affecting their
shares of partnership income, then such a provision will be recognized for tax purposes." 61 Two notions may strike the reader of
this brief passage. First, substantial economic effect as herein used
only validates a special allocation because it contradicts a conclusion that the allocation is "merely" for tax avoidance purposes.
This is important because no reading of the sentence hints that
lack of substantial economic effect might be used to invalidate an
allocation. Secondly, the threshold for validating an allocation
seems fairly low. The sentence implies an allocation will be good
unless it is merely a device for avoiding taxes. Thus, methods not
mentioned might validate an allocation by demonstrating more
than mere tax avoidance. Such a method could be a showing of
business purpose.
The second source for the application of substantial economic
effect to the principal purpose test is the treasury regulation for
section 704, 62 which reads:
Partner's Distributive Share.
(b)
(2)
58.
59.
60.

Distributive share determined by income or loss ratio.
. . . In determining whether the principal purpose of

Weidner, supra note 56, at 469.
Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,567.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4363 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1337].
61. S. REP. No. 4621, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 5021 (emphasis added).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (1964).
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any provision in the partnership agreement for a special allocation is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax,
the provision must be considered in relation to all the surrounding facts and circumstances. Among the relevant circumstances are the following: Whether the partnership or a
partner individually has a business purpose for the allocation; whether the allocation has "substantial economic effect," that is, whether the allocation may actually affect the
dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences;
whether related items. . . from the same source are subject
to the same allocation; whether the allocation was made
without recognition of normal business factors and only after the amount of the specially allocated item could reasonably be estimated; the duration of the allocation; and the
overall tax consequences of the allocation."

Clearly, substantial economic effect is listed here as only one of
several factors, including business purpose and the range of normal
business factors. If all these factors were considered in relation to
the surrounding facts and circumstances, the allocation in Allison
would appear valid.4 However, case decisions relying on the Senate report and treasury regulations found substantial economic effect to be the dominant of the relevant circumstances.
The first and still most important case considering this question
6 5
is Orrisch v. Commissioner.
After citing the Senate report and
Treasury Regulation section 1.704-1, the court noted
that the Senate language "was apparently added in the Senate
Finance Committee to allay fears that special allocations of income or deductions would be denied effect in every case where
the allocation resulted in a reduction in the income tax liabilities ....
[T]he statement is an affirmation that special allocations are ordinarily to be recognized if they have business validity
apart from their tax consequences. 6
In striking the allocation before it, the court concluded that the
allocation "was adopted for a tax-avoidance rather than a business
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1964) (emphasis added).
64. The trial judge found that Souex had a valid business purpose and that the allocation accorded with normal business factors in acquiring cash partners in oil and gas deals.
See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 & 48-50.
65. 55 T.C. 395 (1970), aff'd per curiam, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-1069 (9th Cir. 1973).
66. Id. at 400-01 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Unfortunately, the language of the court set business

purpose and tax avoidance as incompatible, rather than coexistent
purposes, the principal one of which required discovery by the
court. The Orrisch decision went on to conclude that the agreement before it did not reflect normal business considerations."
Before reaching that point in the decision, the court in Orrisch had
considered two of the six relevant circumstances of the regulations,
and found the deal lacking. 9
The Orrisch court then moved on to an argument by the taxpayers that because their allocation was reflected in the capital accounts70 of the partners, the allocation had substantial economic
effect. Under the regulations this required some impact of the allocation upon future dollar shares of the partners. The court, in an
analysis of the partnership's capital accounts, found such future
impact absent." Having tested three separate circumstances recommended by the regulations, the court concluded the principal
purpose of the allocation to be tax avoidance.7 2 The longest discussion, however, was of the final factor considered, that of the economic effect of the allocation as measured by the capital accounts.
In 1974, Harris v. Commissioner7 3 picked up where Orrisch left
off. Faced again with a challenge to a partnership allocation, the
67. Id. at 401.
68. Id.
69. These same two factors were present in Allison according to the trial court's findings. See supra note 64.
70. The capital accounts of a partnership are a record of the total capital burdens and
receipts of each partner regarding the partnership. If an account is positive the partner has
contributed more to the partnership than he has received from it. If negative, the opposite
conclusion is drawn. Because the accounts reflect all movement of capital in the partnership,
at the end of the partnership the sum total of all accounts must equal zero (at least in
simple arrangements). If each individual partner's account equals zero then no partner has
recovered another's investment. The account is generally increased by the amount of cash
and adjusted basis of property contributed and the taxable partnership income claimed by
the partner. It is debited by the amounts of cash, the adjusted basis of property distributed,
and any share of partnership loss claimed by the partner. See 48 Fed. Reg. 9871, 9874 (1983)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed March 4, 1983).
The capital accounts test holds that if:
(1) the special allocation is reflected on the capital accounts; and
(2) the capital accounts will control distributions upon liquidation; and
(3) any negative accounts will be regarded as a debt to the partnership,
then the partner bears the burden of the special allocation. If gain is not produced to cover
a loss taken, for instance, then the partner will give up recovery of capital contributed to the
partnership, otherwise receivable, or will replace the loss to the partnership by an additional
contribution. See A. WmLs, supra note 33, at § 86.03; 48 Fed. Reg. at 9873.
71. Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 402-04.
72. Id. at 404.
73. 61 T.C. 770 (1974).
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court looked to the regulations to determine that the disposition
was part of a valid business plan. The court found that Congress
plainly intended this structuring of tax burdens and stated that, in
addition, the allocation had an "obvious economic effect. '7 4 The
court treated economic effect as being of critical significance, since
the allocation was reflected on the partnership's capital accounts
and would reduce the amount received on liquidation by the taxpayer accordingly. This "sharply" distinguished the case from
Orrisch.7 5
The process converting substantial economic effect from a "circumstance" to a replacement "test" for determining the principle
purpose of an allocation in pre-1976 cases appears to have been
completed by Magaziner v. Commissioner6 in 1978. Magaziner
cited Orrisch for the proposition that "a special allocation will be
given effect only if it has business validity apart from its tax consequences," and then cited Harris for the "critical significance" of
substantial economic effect." The court then promptly collapsed
business validity under substantial economic effect by only considering whether "the allocation [might] actually affect the dollar
amount of the partner's shares of total partnership income or loss
'' 8
independently of tax consequences. 1
The conclusion drawn is, of course, only the regulations' definition of substantial economic effect, one of several circumstances
mentioned. Magaziner, through utilizing Orrisch and Harris,took
the separate circumstances of business purpose, substantial economic effect and normal business factors, as set out by the regulations, and combined them under substantial economic effect. This
may have been what was meant by the court in Hamilton v.
United States7 when it held that substantial economic effect is
the key factor to be considered in any analysis of the viability of a
special allocation. An allocation that lacks "substantial economic
effect" will not be saved by meeting the other five factors in the
regulation, and it is unlikely that an allocation that has "substantial economic effect" would not also meet the other factors.8 0
74. Id. at 785-86.
75. Id. at 786.
76. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 873 (1978).
77. Id. at 875 (citations omitted).
78. Id. (citation ommitted).
79. 687 F.2d 408 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
80. Id. at 414. Hamilton did not cite Orrisch, Harris or Magaziner when it announced
this conclusion. Id.
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Neither the Hamilton court nor the Allison court explained why
substantial economic effect necessarily includes or precludes the
other five factors listed in the regulations. Nor did they explain
how what had been three factors in Orrisch became one.
Yet, other authors looking at the question of "principal purpose"
have come to the same basic conclusion that substantial economic
effect has predominated. One leading partnership taxation manual
wrote, while considering the effects of the 1976 section 704(b) language change, that "[b]ecause the Regulations and the courts had
established the preeminence of the substantial economic effect test
under prior law . . . [the revision] Was probably less substantive

than it might otherwise seem."81 In addition, it adds that the other
'82
factors listed in the regulations "were given only nominal effect.
Other commentators have identified substantial economic effect as
clearly "[tihe most important factor,

83

or discerned an emerging

8
consensus that it is a fundamental test. 4
Congress may have encouraged this view when it replaced principal purpose with substantial economic effect in 1976. The Senate
report reflected a desire to limit special allocations to those with
substantial economic effect, "as presently interpreted by the regulations and case law." 85 The House version had a differing legislative purpose8 but declared the regulations "focused" on substantial economic effect, while they only "inquired" as to business
purpose and other factors.87 The Senate displayed an, additional
desire that the other factors be regarded as important in the deter-

81. W. McKEE, supra note 56, at 10-16. The substantial economic effect test is also
referred to as the "litmus" test for determining principal purpose. Id. at 1 10-11. A similar
conclusion was expressed in A. WILLIS, supra note 33, at § 82-4: "Although this. . . change
appears to be a substantial one in concept, from a practical standpoint it should result in
very little difference." Id.
82. A. WILLIS, supra note 33, at 10-11.
83. Kopple, supra note 56, at 638. He also notes that the other factors have received
only limited discussion and like Hamilton suggests that a finding of substantial economic
effect may preclude inquiry into other factors, but he does not suggest that failure to find
substantial economic effect should end inquiry without consideration of other factors. Id. at
638-39. See also Solomon, Current Planning for Partnership Startup, Including Special
Allocations and Guaranteed Payments, 37 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 13.03[21, at 13-8 (1979)
[hereinafter Solomon], where he contends that while substantial economic effect became the
most important test, it was not the only factor, and so an allocation that had substantial
economic effect might be disallowed, while an allocation without it might still be good because of sound business reasons for the allocation.
84. Weidner, supra note 56, at 469.
85. See S. REP. No. 938, supra note 35, 1976 U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS at 3535-36.
86. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
87. See H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 34, 1976 U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEws at 3020.
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mination of allocation validity, but did not explain how this would
occur, since substantial economic effect was established as the
test. 88 One might presume that this also indicated a belief that
substantial economic effect always subsumed the other factors and
did not merely override them, but some commentators have had
difficulty explaining this.89 Another prominent commentator arrives at this conclusion, stating: "A close analysis of these criteria
will show that they can be applied in the determination of whether
a special allocation has substantial economic effect," 90 but he does
not do any analysis to apply them.
Whatever their strength, these sources support the Allison
court's conclusion that the 1976 Act effected little change, even if
that conclusion overstates the clarity of prior case law. The Senate
report did have an important comment about congressional intent
for the rule they were creating: "While there is a difference in language, the intent of the committee amendment and the House bill
are essentially the same-both versions seek to prevent the use of
special allocations for tax avoidance purposes, while allowing their
use for bona fide business purposes."91 If Congress also intended
to encourage partnerships, among others, to invest in oil and gas,
then should not the allocation of IDC to the partners who require
it for encouragement be regarded fundamentally as a valid business purpose whatever standard of evaluation is used? Remember,
in Orrisch, a finding that business purpose was lacking invalidated
that deal. By adopting the Hamilton standard, Allison completely
ignores business purpose in finding substantial economic effect.
Under the court's analysis such effect either exists or it does not;
valid business purposes may coexist, but they do not create substantial economic effect.' 2 They therefore are clearly outside even
88. See S. REP. No. 938, supra note 35, 1976 U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS at 3536.
89. McKee uses the Senate language to conclude that the 1976 change had little effect,
W. MCKEE, supra note 56, at 10-11, but could not explain the use of the other factors since
they were largely ignored prior to 1976, except to say they might in extreme cases invalidate

an allocation with economic effect, but never validate an allocation without it. Id. at 10-25.
But see Solomon, supra note 83, at 13-10. He sees no role for the other factors since if
Congress changed the law it should have intended that substantial economic effect be the
sole requirement, even if this allows allocations whose sole purpose is tax avoidance.
90. A. WILLIS, supra note 33, at § 82-5.
91. See S. REP. No. 938, supra note 35, 1976 U.S. CONG. CODE AD. NEWS at 3536 (emphasis added).
92. In fact, the court of appeals went so far as to distinguish the valid business purpose
standard used in the trial court and mentioned by Congress from the business validity language of Orrisch in order to explain why the trial court standard was incorrect. Allison, 83-1
U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,568 n.5. The text of the note is as follows:
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the uncertain intent of Congress.
III.

SUBSTANTIAL

ECONOMIC EFFECT

IN

Allison

A. Allison and Capital Accounts Analysis
Having determined that principal purpose should be tested in
terms of substantial economic effect, the court of appeals, consulting the regulations, turned to test the economic effect of the Allison allocation. 3 Finding no cases dealing with a full allocation of
IDC to a cash partner, the court turned to the cases under section
704(b)(2) dealing with allocations of other items."'
The cases upon which the court based its decision were, Orrisch,
Magaziner, Harris and Hamilton." Relying on these cases, the
court concluded that the Souex allocations of IDC entirely to Indomar lacked any economic effect aside from the tax consequences. 96 It adopted an analysis of the partnership capital accounts, referred to as capital accounts analysis, from the cited
cases to reach its conclusion.'
In Orrisch, the taxpayers and another couple acting as the second "partner" entered into an oral partnership agreement to
purchase and operate two buildings. They agreed to share all expenses, profits, and losses equally, despite disparate initial capital
contributions. They operated the partnership and generated net
losses for three years.'" At the beginning of the fourth year, the
partners orally agreed that the taxpayers would receive all the depreciation deductions for that and subsequent years, while all else
Whether an allocation has "business validity" is not necessarily the same as
whether it was adopted for a "valid business purpose." In assessing the former we
must determine the economic effect of the allocation. Dissecting a "valid business
purpose," on the other hand, may not call for an analysis of economic effect, although it is not clear that a special allocation-or, for that matter, the business
enterprise as a whole-can be considered to have a valid business purpose if the
allocation does not also have a substantial economic effect.
While footnote five may have a fair point about the difference between valid business
purpose and business validity, when defined in terms of economic effect, it would seem the
fault lies not with the valid purpose factor which has been part of the law from the beginning, but with the unexplained, and therefore unwarranted, holdings that substantial economic effect (business validity) is the only relevant factor in Hamilton and Allison.
93. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,568 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (1964)).
94. Id. at 86,568.
95. Id. at 86,568-69.

96. Id. at 86,569.
97.
98.

Id. at 86,568-69.
Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 396.
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would continue to be shared evenly. They further agreed that
should the partnership property be sold at a gain, the specially allocated depreciation would be "charged back" to the taxpayer's
capital account and they would pay the tax burden caused by the
depreciation deductions. They proceeded under this agreement for
two years, driving the taxpayer's capital account negative while his
partner's account remained positive."
Looking to the gain charge back provision 0 " for gain realized on
the sale of the property, the court noted that if the gain realized
exceeded the disparity in the capital accounts of the partners, then
the remaining gain would be divided equally, along with the proceeds of the sale.
In such circumstances, the only effect of the allocation would
be a trade of tax consequences, i.e., the [other partner] would relinquish a current depreciation deduction in exchange for exoneration of all or part of the capital gains tax when the property is
sold, and [the taxpayers] would enjoy a larger current depreciation deduction but would assume a larger ultimate capital gains
tax liability. Quite clearly, if the property is sold at a gain, the
special allocation will affect only the tax liabilities of the partners
and will have no other economic effect.101
To find economic effect, the Orrisch court concluded it must
"look to see who is to bear the economic burden of the depreciation if the buildings should be sold for a sum less than their original cost,"' 1 2 that is, if the gain realized was insufficient to restore
to the capital account all the effects of the depreciation. The crucial passage of the court's analysis followed:
Under normal accounting procedures, if the building were sold at
a gain less than the amount of such disparity [the taxpayers]
would either be required to contribute to the partnership a sum
equal to the remaining deficit in their capital account after the
gain on the sale had been added back or would be entitled to
99. Id. at 397-98.
100. Id. at 401. The court in Orrisch considered several factors recommended by the

regulations before it reached substantial economic effect at the urging of the taxpayers. Id.
at 401. The taxpayers argued that their allocation had substantial economic effect solely
because it was reflected in the capital accounts. Only in this context did the court analyze
the capital accounts to meet the argument, and capital accounts analysis was born. Id. at
402-04.
101. Id. at 403.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
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receive a proportionately smaller share of the partnership assets
on liquidation."0 3

Since the partners did not intend that a negative capital account
should be a debt to the partnership nor that capital accounts
would control the proceeds on liquidation, reflecting the allocation
in the capital accounts would not affect the partners' share in total
income or loss independent of tax consequences. 10
Several points may be made from this discussion. First, reflecting an allocation on the capital accounts of the partnership will
only have substantial economic effect if the capital accounts will
control liquidation proceeds. Second, if the allocation is such that
it may result in a negative capital account, the partner must be
required to restore the deficit to achieve substantial economic effect. 10 5 Third, capital accounts analysis was not proffered as the
only method of finding substantial economic effect. Fourth, a gain
charge back provision, in and of itself, cannot create substantial
economic effect, and is at best neutral. Finally, the purpose of the
exercise is to determine who bears the burden behind the allocation, but the burden need only be potential, and may never come
to pass.
Harris upheld an allocation because it found both a valid business plan and obvious economic effect. 10 6 The entire basis for finding economic effect was the reflection of the allocation on the capital accounts and control of liquidation proceeds by the adjusted
103. Id. at 403-04 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 404.
105. This results since capital accounts reflect the total contributions and receipts of a
partner from a partnership and, as such, ultimately the total of all capital accounts will be
zero. If one account is negative, then some other account must be positive, and so some
other partner has made the contribution bearing the burden of the deduction creating the
negative account. For a more detailed description of the impact of negative capital accounts,
see A. WILLIS, supra note 33, at § 86.05; W. McKEE, supra note 56, at I 10.02[2][b].
Where a negative capital account can result, the implication is that one partner has received greater compensation from the partnership than his investments are responsible for
creating. Since the partner was not required to restore the account deficit to the partnership, and his partner's account would therefore remain positive, his partner's investment,
and not his own, would be that unrecovered if the sale of the asset resulted in a real economic loss to the partnership. Thus his partner might bear the burden of the depreciation
deduction. If depreciation of a building works as an advancement of recovery of capital, the
disparity in capital accounts would mean that the recovery of capital had gone to a partner
other than the partner responsible for the capital contribution. W. MCKEE, supra note 56,
at 10.02[2][b].
106. Harris,61 T.C. at 785-86.
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capital accounts.1 07 Magaziner held that the partner who benefits
from the special allocation must bear its costs. This case also concerned depreciation of a building,10 8 which was disallowed by using
0 9 In Hamilton, the court
capital accounts analysis as in Orrisch.1
stated plainly that "[t]he validity of an allocation is tested by examining the effect of the allocation on the capital accounts of the
partners at liquidation." 110
The Allison court, using a capital accounts test, took exception
with the IDC allocation for two reasons. There was no gain charge
back provision, which was not in itself fatal; but critically, there
was no provision "entitling Indomar to a proportionately smaller
share of liquidation proceeds, calculated according to the adjusted
capital accounts." ''
In pointing to the lack of a gain charge back provision, the court
cited Magaziner as holding that such provisions are customary
when losses are specially allocated to capital-providing partners. 2
What the court fails to realize is that IDC deductions do not reduce basis in a capital asset. By their nature, the IDC deductions
allow expensing of an asset, expressly avoiding the process of
charging the cost to capital and later depreciating it. " In the case
of IDC, unlike normal depreciation, there is no built-in gain realization equated with the deduction amount reflected in reduced basis. Without such gain to charge back, any attempt to allocate the
first taxable income earned to Indomar would simply have delayed
the time when liquidation would award more proceeds to the other
partners in order to equalize the capital accounts.' 1 4 Thus, the Allison deal was not subject to the same cleanup opportunities as
existed in the depreciation cases of Orrisch and Magaziner. Gain
107. Id. at 786.
108. Magaziner, 37 T.C.M. at 874.
109. Id. at 875-76.
110. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 419 n.29. The Hamilton court at least claimed to be evaluating a different question, however, that of economic substance. See Comment, Partnership
Allocations: Flipping Through the Substantial Economic Effect Hoops, 11 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 407, 417-19. They also allowed an allocation despite imperfect capital account results.
Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 419 n.29.
111. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,569.
112. Id. (citing Magaziner, 37 T.C.M. at 876).
113. See I.R.C. § 263(c) (CCH 1983); Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4 (1965).
114. For more on gain charge backs, see A. WILLIS, supra note 33, at § 86.04; and W.
McKsa, supra note 56, at 10.02 [2][a]. The economic effect of gain charge backs may still
be questioned, however, and Congress may have contemplated something at least similar as
allowable in 1954. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 60, 1954 U.S. CONG. CODE & AD.
NEws at 4092.
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charge back could not have worked.
Clearly, however, the capital accounts were not intended to control liquidation proceeds, so the court of appeals is correct in that
Allison does not meet the capital accounts standard. Indomar was
entitled to receive 13.5417% of the proceeds under any circumstance relative to the allocation. Only nonparticipation in some
particular well would have reduced that amount.11 5 Therefore,
nothing about the allocation reduced the amount of Indomar's
share of partnership distributions, at least not after the agreement
was reached. But the court of appeals never considered an important distinction between Orrisch and Allison. The taxpayers in Orrisch dreamed up the special allocation three years after the agreement creating the partnership. Thus the allocation had no role in
the partners' determination of their distributive shares. In Allison,
the allocation was subject to negotiation from the beginning, and it
could reasonably be expected that had the allocation not been
made, the cash partner's distributive share would have required an
increase commensurate with the higher risk of loss. Such an effect
on the dollar amounts of the partners' distributive shares would be
real enough economically, but it would never be reflected on the
capital accounts. The court of appeals seems to have never considered this possibility for finding economic effect, but did leave the
door open to the potential for some demonstration of economic effect other than capital accounts analysis.11 6
Unfortunately, congressional approval of capital accounts analysis as the sole arbiter of substantial economic effect 1 7 is even less
obvious than such approval for substantial economic effect as the
sole factor in the principal purpose test. Despite the weaknesses of
the analysis, " s it appears to be entrenched. The newly proposed
regulations for section 704 adopt entirely a capital accounts approach for post-1976 partnership allocations. 1 " However, the true
standard for economic effect would seem to be determined by
115. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,569-70.
116. Id. at 86,570. The court simply was not persuaded that any such other method
applied in Allison's case.
117. The only statement on the subject contemplates use of capital accounts, but does
not require it or limit the inquiry to capital accounts analysis. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT
oF 1976, 95 n.6 (1976).
118. See Solomon, supra note 83, at 13-10, 13-16 to -17; Krane & Sheffield, Beyond Orrisch: An Alternative View of SubstantialEconomic Effect Under Section 704(b)(2) Where
Nonrecourse Debt Is Involved, 60 TAXEs 937 (1982) [hereinafter Krane].
119. 48 Fed. Reg. at 9871.
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which partner is "bearing the burden" of the allocation, 1 0 and the
proposed regulations at least link the concepts.'21
B. Bearing the Economic Burden of an Allocation other than
through Capital Accounts
Notwithstanding the current hegemony of capital accounts analysis as the sole arbiter of substantial economic effect, the overriding principle of the test has always been measuring the economic
burden lying behind any given special allocation. An idea persists
that an allocation should be allowed where it reflects in its allocation of tax burden the economic reality underlying the tax item
allocated in the real economic deal of the partners.' The conclusion of the court of appeals on this point, that "even if there might
be circumstances in which capital accounts analysis would fail to
demonstrate an otherwise viable economic effect of an allocation,
plaintiff has not persuaded us that this is such a case, '" ' s may offer
an opportunity for future holdings that economic effect might exist
without meeting the basic capital accounts requirements.
The regulations have defined substantial economic effect as a
finding that the allocation "may actually affect the dollar amount
of the partners' shares of the total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences."' 24 The effect sought consists of
some future or forward looking consequence on real world economic results, which at least may occur under reasonably foreseeable conditions.
Such a method conforms with the testing principle applied in
120. See supra text accompanying note 102.
121. 48 Fed. Reg. at 9873.
122. The freedom with which partners should be able to pass on individual tax consequences of partnership activity depends on adopting either an aggregate or entity theory of
the nature of a partnership. In this longstanding debate, aggregate theorists have maintained that a partnership consists of a collection of individuals working together. Entity
theorists have focused instead on the partnership as a thing in itself separate from the individuals. Subchapter K adopts differing points of view with differing sections. From an aggregate point of view allowing each individual to receive tax consequences based on the individual character of his involvement makes perfect sense. Entity analysis, however, will require
that each result of partnership activity should be spread throughout the partners' interests
without looking behind the entity to determine who caused the occurrence. For federal taxation purposes, the entity theory of partnership predominates. See A. WILLIs, supra note 33,
at §§ 2.04-.07.
123. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,570 (footnote omitted).
124. Tress. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2). See also S. REP. No. 938, supra note 35, 1976 U.S.
CONG. CODE & AD. NEws at 3536.
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Orrisch and succeeding cases. 12 The Orrisch court declared that
"to find any economic effect of the special allocation. . . we must
' . . look to see who is to bear the economic burden of the depreci-

ation if the buildings should be sold for a sum less than their original costs.'

2

6

Since the depreciation in that case, caused by appli-

cation of loans to basis, was sufficient to drive a capital account
negative, the court looked to provisions surrounding the accounts
to find what economic impact this result would affect.127 The
method of determining a lack of economic burden involved discovering the potential that a negative capital account might be created as a result of the allocation and not correctable later. 2 8

Other cases have spoken of the general principle in similar
terms. Holladay v. Commissioner2 9 stated that "for allocations to
be bona fide they must accurately reflect the basis on which the
[partners] agreed to share the economic profits and bear the economic losses of the joint venture." 30 Harrisspoke of both the need
to consider how the allocation is reflected in the capital accounts
under a realistic liquidation plan, and the accuracy of the reflection. 131 This approach is unlike Orrisch, where the effect of the depreciation allocation was merely "transitory."132 Even Magaziner,
which used the substantial economic effect test and capital accounts analysis whole-heartedly, did so to measure if "the partner
who benefits from a special allocation of tax deductions must bear
the entire cost (burden) of such deductions.' 3 83
Perhaps the best case of all from Allison's point of view is Lewis
v. Commissioner," where full allocation of an interest deduction
was made to a 50 % partner who paid the cash for the interest pay125. See, e.g., Kresser v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1621, 1630-31 (1970).
126. Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 403.
127. For examples of low capital accounts that might go negative and their impact, see
A. WILIS, supra note 33, at §§ 86.03, 86.05; W. McKEE, supra note 56, at 10.02[21 -[21[b];
Weidner, supra note 56, at 487. Capital accounts are regarded as reflecting the relative
levels of contributions and recoveries of capital to a partnership by a partner. They are
increased by costs to him, and decreased by compensations. See supra note 70.
128. Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 397-98.
129. 72 T.C. 571, 588 (1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1981).
130. See also Boynton v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1147, 1158, af'd 649 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982), which states: "[Tihe partnership agreement [allocations] must be bona fide in the sense that they are genuinely in accord with the actual
division of profits and losses inter sese [sic] which the partners have in fact agreed upon

among themselves."
131.
132.
133.
134.

Harris, 61 T.C, at 785-86.
Id. at 786.
Magaziner, 37 T.C.M. at 875.
65 T.C. 625 (1975).
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ments." s5 The court allowed the allocation because "[a] particular
deduction may.

. .

be specially allocated to the partner who bears

the economic burden of the expenditure underlying the
deduction."" 6
The newly proposed regulations agree that the basic purpose of
capital accounts analysis is to determine the economic burden of
the deduction. The proposed regulations divide the question of
substantial economic effect into two parts: economic effect and the
substantiality of the effect.13 7 Economic effect is defined entirely in
terms of capital accounts. The rule requires that the allocation be
reflected in the capital accounts, liquidation proceeds are to be distributed in accordance with the adjusted capital accounts balances,
and any partner with a deficit account following distribution of liquidation proceeds must restore the amount to the partnership. 3"

The meaning of finding economic effect is set out, however, as follows: "Thus, the partner to whom an allocation is made must receive the economic benefit or bear the economic burden or risk associated with the allocation." 3 Substantiality is defined as a
consideration of: "[T]he likelihood and magnitude of a shift in the
economic consequences among [the] partners ...

weighed against

the shifting of tax consequences resulting from the allocation,...
particularly tax consequences which result from the interaction of
the allocation . . . with the partners' nonpartnership tax attributes.' ' 4 0 The test for substantiality admits of subjective standards.

Its purpose appears to be prevention of low cash investment tax
shelters which produce high levels of deduction, such as the deal in
Orrisch. The proposed regulations then repeat the other factors
found in the current regulations for evaluation4 of principal purpose, but without explanation as to their use.' '
The proposed regulations offer one more glimpse of the purpose2
of capital accounts analysis when discussing nonrecourse debt."
Since "allocations of loss or deduction . . . attributable to nonre-

course debt which is secured by partnership property do not have
substantial economic effect since the creditor bears the economic
135. Id. at 627-28.
136. Id. at 632-33 (citing Orrisch, 55 T.C. at 633).
137. 48 Fed. Reg. at 9873.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 9874.
142. For a discussion of why capital accounts fail to work adequately to explain special
allocations in nonrecourse debt situations, see Krane, supra note 118.
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burden of any losses attributable thereto, . . . such allocations

must be made in accordance with the partners' interests in the
partnership.""' 8 Notice that the lack of substantial economic effect
occurs because the underlying burden lies outside the partnership,
not because a special allocation is somehow incapable of reflection
on the capital accounts.
This discussion has been intended to demonstrate that economic
effect is a function of bearing economic burden, and not capital
accounts analysis. The analysis only serves as a tool to discover
economic burden, and should only be used where it functions correctly. The possibility remains that some other method of determining economic burden might be effective in cases where capital
accounts fail to demonstrate the burden. The emphasis should not
be on resolving a mechanical question involving the occurrence of
or lack of certain provisions in a partnership agreement. Instead it
should be on the real location of the burden (or risk of loss) behind
any venture. Risk of loss is the factor which must be accounted for
in the formation of any business enterprise. And the risk of loss is
the economic reality Congress tried to effect when it offered to
take over some portion of intangible drilling costs by means of tax
44
1

relief.

Two questions must be answered to find economic effect in this
way. First, is this an appropriate case for use of some other measure than capital accounts? If so, what other justification or burden may be relied on to supply the basis of the deduction? Such
inquiry may take varied paths in varied cases, but a fair guide can
be taken from Hamilton: "The key factor behind any analysis of
the validity of a partnership allocation is that the allocation must
45
reflect the true economic substance of the partners' deal.M
The court of appeals did address the "burden of the allocation"
question in closing its opinion. 14 Essentially, it concluded that
even looking at the deal itself "fails to explain how the allocation
itself could have affected the partners' shares independently of tax
143. 48 Fed. Reg. at 9876 (emphasis added). Notice a partner now may have multiple
"interests" in the partnership since the regulations recognize complete diversity potentially
in the allocation of any items. Id.
144. When Congress agrees not to collect taxes otherwise owed, it enters the marketplace
and makes some activity more attractive than it would be otherwise. When such a deduction
is purchased by means of an actual cash expenditure, the Congress simply takes over a
portion of the purchase price. Here the Congress agreed to finance up to 70% of oil drilling
if investors would risk the loss of the other 30%.
145. Hamilton, 687 F.2d at 417.
146. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,570.
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consequences.', 7 The court correctly pointed out that even with
the complete exhaustion of its $8.75 million investment, Indomar
did not lose everything since it remained entitled to a 13% interest
in the contract upon liquidation and retained presumably saleable
interests in future involvement in the partnership itself. These interests were received in exchange for the cash, and the court's apparent conclusion is that the other Souex partners therefore bore
almost 87% of the cash loss in the failed drilling. Thus, in an approach not very different from capital accounts analysis itself, the
court found that Indomar did not bear the entire loss behind the
14 8
deduction, and the allocation could not be supported.
The court failed to consider two points, however. First, where
the government offers deductions for a current expense, it subsidizes the activity. Thus, up to 70% of the money paid by Indomar
would be recovered in the real value of the tax deductions. The
risk that did support this governmental involvement, that is, the
only risk which could support the deduction, was the payment of
the cash up front, and this risk Indomar bore. By the real economics of the deal, potentially only 30% of the exhaustion of resources
would be suffered by members of the Souex partnership. In addition, as a member of the entity, Indomar bore 13.5417% of that
30% risk. Therefore, Indomar bore over 70% of the risk behind
the deduction that there existed to bear. What counts is that Indomar's tax result was not truly as divergent from the real risk it
agreed to bear as the court of appeals would suggest.'"
The second difference is that the burden associated with an allocation of IDC fundamentally differs from the depreciation in Orrisch. The IDC deduction can never exceed the actual cash contribution of the partner, at least where, as here, the deduction is
traced directly to the contribution source. Orrisch was able to recover deductions in excess of actual cash outlay. But no sane taxpayer would enter a deal where he paid one dollar hard currency in
exchange for one dollar in tax deduction. The value of the tax deduction will always be less than the dollar amount required up
front. Therefore, this was no tax shelter, but a deal arranged for
profit, accepting the encouragement Congress offered with IDC
deductions.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 86,570-71.
149. Of course, it was also not exactly as dire as the Court of Claims suggested. However,
the Court of Claims and the allocation come much closer than the court of appeals and the
forced reallocation to measuring the actual burden.
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Another important distinction from Orrisch in this regard comes
from the timing of the special allocation decision. The Orrisch
style allocation, which is made after formation of general partnership interests, obviously has no effect unless it modifies those interests. But the allocation decision made during negotiation of the
original partnership interests has an immediate and permanent effect upon those interests. Indomar took the risk of losing 30% of
its money if the contract proved to be valueless. It assumed that
risk in exchange for 13.5417% of potential returns on that investment. If, instead, the Indomar partners faced the potential loss of
nearly 87% of their capital, we might safely presume they would
desire triple rewards to cover triple risks. Just as a target, such
rewards would require a 39% interest in the underlying contract.
Thus, the allocation of the IDC deduction did have a real world
impact on the economic deal that was substantial and permanent,
but which could never appear on the capital accounts.
Before the advent of capital accounts analysis, such an allocation
looked to be entirely possible. Example five of Treasury Regulation
section 1.704(b)(2) and Revenue Ruling 68-13915o both involved
transactions where the partner putting up cash resulting in deductions received full allocation of the deductions as passed through
by the partnership. Example five concludes: "Since all of the...
expenditures and interest specially allocated to G are in fact borne
by G, the allocation will be recognized in the absence of other circumstances showing that its principal purpose was tax avoidance
or evasion." 15 1 Similarly, Revenue Ruling 68-139 held that the IDC
directed to the cash partners would be upheld unless found to be
for avoidance or evasion of tax. One important commentator has
seized upon the last phrase to incorporate capital accounts analysis
into both. 152 But it would be more reasonable to conclude that the
true intention was validation of the allocation without showing the
slightest interest in capital accounts. As another key commentator
has noted, "its [Revenue Ruling 68-139] purpose is obscure if it
was not intended to approve the allocation." 15
If it is true that economic burden is the key and may be shown
without resort to a pure capital accounts analysis, then that conclusion may be bolstered by the treatise most loyal to capital accounts analysis. The authority noted the trial court's Allison opin150.
151.
152.
153.

Rev. Rul. 68-139, 1968-1 C.B. 311.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704(b)(2) Example 5.
See W. McKEs, supra note 56, at 11 10.92[1], 10.05[g].
A. WILLIS, supra note 33, at § 82.13.
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ion, concluding: "While the trial judge's analysis is not explicated
precisely in terms of capital accounts analysis, it appears consistent with such analysis and embraces the same basic concepts in
analyzing the way in which the economic burden of the expenditures would be borne by the partners. ' 15 4 The trial court had, of
course, found the burden to lie on Indomar.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While there may be some opportunity to define substantial economic effect in terms of economic burden measured outside of capital accounts, the current trend does not support this. The Allison
decision makes capital accounts analysis applicable both to pre1976 and post-1976 cases, and finds no other burden to support an
allocation. 15 ' With the proposal of new regulations couched entirely in terms of capital accounts analysis, such analysis would appear to be firmly entrenched as the wave of the future. This appears the case despite a lack of clear congressional intent to use
the test exclusively.
The courts should establish some method of upholding allocations to respond to the declared intent of Congress to encourage
certain activities. Otherwise such allocations will be frustrated by
the same rules designed to restrict use of tax shelters marketing
tax savings in excess of capital investment. Such a result is unattractive and would be counterproductive to congressional purpose.
The ability to maintain the burden of a deduction based on the
simple contribution of the cash behind the deduction requires
154. W. McKaa, supra note 56, at 10.05[q] (emphasis added).
155. Ironically, the balance of capital accounts sought on liquidation under the capital
accounts test would actually be met in Allison despite the failure to provide for control of
liquidation proceeds by the accounts in the partnership agreement. All additions and subtractions from the Souex partners' accounts subsequent to the exploratory drilling would be
by partnership interest, and would be equal in the end. Ignoring these, Indomar would have
a credit on its account equal to its contributed cash, and this would be reduced to zero by
the special allocation of a corresponding amount of IDC deduction. The other three partners
would have an unrecovered recredit equal to their adjusted basis in the contributed property. See 48 Fed. Reg. at 9874. On distribution to them of their share of the property they
should have basis in their partnership interests equal to this unrecovered investment in the
property. See I.R.C. § 705 (CCH 1976) for the partner's basis in his interest. The adjusted
basis will therefore be reassigned to the property distributed out to those three partners
even though they take a lesser share of the contract than they contributed. They will recover their capital subsequently in the same manner basis in an asset is generally recovered.
Thus, in this particular case, the mechanics of the partnership rules force all partners' capital accounts to zero. They realized complete recovery of all capital investments and no partner ultimately bore the burden of unrecovered capital for which another partner received a
deduction.
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breaking down the partnership entity into its partners. This difference in approach has been termed an aggregate approach versus an
entity approach.1 56 The Souex partnership agreed to allocate to
each partner the tax consequences of its contribution. 7 If an aggregate approach was allowed, Indomar would receive the current
expense deduction attributed to its cash contribution for drilling.
The other Souex partners would receive recovery of capital either
by depreciation or reduction from the amount received on sale.
This would serve to give each partner back his investment with
differing tax consequences, rather than the forced shared consequences of the Allison decision.
The Allison decision as it stands offers little hope of seeing a
court-fashioned standard which truly distinguishes legitimate investments with tax elements from wasteful diversions of capital to
unproductive tax avoidance enterprises. The oil deal in Allison was
established to produce wealth while meeting a nationally desired
goal. It has been broken by rules created to limit deals designed to
lose. It would be beneficial for the courts to begin fashioning rules
which distinguish between undesirable tax shelters and tax supplements of rationally declared goals.
PETER DORAGH

156. See Krane, supra note 118, for the argument that an aggregate approach is allowed;
but see McKee, PartnershipAllocations in Real Estate Ventures Crane, Kresser and Orrisch, 30 TAx L. REV. (1974), in which the author of the new regulations explains hostility to
any aggregate approach.
157. Allison, 83-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. at 86,565.

